Donald Trump is back, and so is the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran to “drastically throttle” Tehran’s oil sales.
But 2025 is not 2018. Although Iran was on the ropes then, things are different now.
America’s support for Israel’s campaigns against the Palestinian and Lebanese people has eroded local support for U.S. moves, as many Middle East capitals are doubtful about “maximum pressure” and feel it will increase regional tensions.
Saudi Arabia and Iran are drawing closer since 2023, when they agreed to resume ties. The Saudi crown prince recently spoke to Iran’s new president. Their military chiefs held defense talks last month, and the countries are increasing economic ties.
The presidents of the United Arab Emirates and Iran held their first face-to-face talks in October, and UAE-Iran trade is on the upswing. In addition, Qatar (which shares a natural gas field with Iran) and Iran are trying to broaden their economic ties.
The oil market has changed since 2018 as well.
According to Argus Media, Iran’s oil exports, which were below 500,000 barrels per day through the second half of 2019 and 2020 due to Trump-era sanctions, began increasing in 2021 and have increased every year since.
Iran has expanded its network to bypass sanctions, and has expanded its tanker fleet — so if the U.S. again sanctions Iran, it will find the remaining buyers are “those who do not necessarily fear sanctions.”
After his election, President Masoud Pezeshkian announced his program in “My Message to the New World” and declared his intent to strengthen relations with Iran’s neighbors. He emphasized the need for a “strong region,” said he hoped for “constructive dialogue” with Europe, criticized the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran, and urged Washington “come to terms with reality.”
In October, then-candidate Trump declared, “I would like to see Iran be very successful. The only thing is, they can’t have a nuclear weapon.” His running mate, JD Vance, agreed: “Our interest very much is in not going to war with Iran,” he said. “It would be a huge distraction of resources. It would be massively expensive to our country.”
These are hopeful signs of a desire to reach a negotiated solution, but the U.S. has a habit of abandoning inconvenient commitments, such as its first nuclear deal with Iran.
Iran’s stronger relations with Russia and China have also added to its resilience.
In March 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement that enhances bilateral relations and includes $400 billion investments in Iran’s oil, gas, petrochemicals, transportation and manufacturing sectors. In return, China will receive a steady and discounted supply of Iranian oil.
Russia has supplied Iran with Su-35 fighter jets, Mi-28 attack helicopters and Yak-130 pilot training aircraft; Iran has sent Russia drones and ballistic missiles.
Non-military trade is also increasing. The Moscow Times reports, “Russian exports to Iran rose 27% last year, and Russian imports from Iran increased 10%. Both sides have agreed to scale up trade in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, while Russia has pledged to invest an unprecedented $40 billion in Iran’s oil and gas sector.”
Despite its economic problems, Iran increased its military budget. It is signaling it is willing to negotiate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — but not “under pressure.” Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araqchi, clarified that when he told state television, “There is still an opportunity for diplomacy, although this opportunity is not much. It is a limited opportunity.”
In November, the IAEA reported Iran was implementing measures “aimed at stopping the increase of its stockpile [of near bomb-grade uranium]” though IAEA also noted Iran increased its inventory of 60 percent enriched uranium by 60 percent since August 2024.
But the IAEA board is determined to test Tehran’s patience as, two days after the IAEA report, it passed a resolution censuring Iran for insufficient cooperation with the agency.
Iran’s President Pezeshkian says he is open to U.S. engagement: “Whether we like it or not, we will face the United States in regional and international arenas, and it’s better that we manage this arena ourselves.” Shargh, the reformist daily newspaper, editorialized that Pezeshkian must “avoid past mistakes and assume a pragmatic and multidimensional policy,” though others are skeptical anything will change under Trump.
Trump ally Elon Musk reportedly met Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations in November, and addressed “how to defuse tensions between the two countries.” The meeting would not have happened without Trump’s approval.
Trump will not want to start a war with Iran, as he will be sensitive to the impact on the U.S. economy, so sanctions (and the occasional Israeli attack) may be his only options. If so, and if Iran’s economy and oil export scheme is resilient enough, and Russia and China remain constant, we may be looking at years of low-level conflict, to the delight of the American and Israeli hard-liners.
Each side lacks empathy for the other — the result of years of successful propagandizing. All the while, the hard-liners in each capital see conflict as key to their continued influence, and reap economic rewards from the status quo.
There is a deadline for negotiations with Iran: Oct. 18, 2025, sees the end of the sanctions snapback mechanism, “the last opportunity for world powers to return to all the sanctions that were lifted in the [Iran nuclear] agreement.”
If the U.S. wants to expand a new nuclear deal to include ballistic missiles or Iran’s foreign policy, Iran may suggest similar limits on other countries in the region, and then demand the deal be a treaty to bind future U.S. administrations.
The American political class and its media acolytes have only one strategy — more sanctions — and are ill-equipped for peaceable dealings with Iran. If both sides are realistic, throttle the hard-liners, and Iran offers Trump a deal he feels only he could have made, we may see peace, stability and more economic opportunity for the youth of the Middle East.
“Maximum pressure” is a slogan, not a strategy. If Iran says “yes,” what will Washington do?
By James Durso for Oilprice.com
