While the world’s eyes are fixed on the Iran-Hormuz crisis and the war in Ukraine, a deeper tectonic shift is quietly reshaping the West. The transatlantic alliance is losing its illusions in real time. For decades, Europe viewed this as a partnership; today, it looks more like leverage. Washington’s recent signals are unmistakable: trade support is the price of admission, and US LNG is the tool used to enforce it. This isn't diplomacy—it's hard power in economic form. Yet, leaders in Brussels and The Hague remain dangerously, almost naively, unprepared for the reality of this new landscape.
European policymakers have congratulated themselves on the fact that they have escaped their decades-long dependence on Russian gas. For most EU strategies, but also for countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, and others, this narrative has been clean, politically convenient, and strategically comforting. They have all been pushing the theory that diversification has been achieved and that security has been restored. At the same time, the USA stepped in as the indispensable supplier, more than willing to fill the gap left by Moscow. This move, however, should never have been framed or understood as a neutral shift.
In reality, it is a substitution of dependencies, not their removal. European countries, led by Brussels, have moved from one dominant external supplier to another, based on the assumption that alignment of values will always guarantee alignment of interests. That assumption is now collapsing.
At present, roughly half of Europe’s LNG imports originate from the United States. This situation is not to be framed as diversification, but as concentration. And concentration creates leverage. The more structural Europe’s reliance on US LNG becomes, the more the continent will be exposed to precisely the kind of pressure now being hinted or bluntly stated by US diplomats at in transatlantic trade discussions. Still, the language or threats may be couched in diplomatic phrasing, but Europeans should get the message that access to energy is no longer unconditional.
This clear and dangerous shift comes at a time that could not be worse. Europe’s energy system is not only very tight but also structurally fragile. The disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz, combined with instability affecting Qatari LNG exports, has and will be even more the coming weeks and months push the global gas market into a new phase, which is going to be defined not by surplus but constraint. Due to the Qatar LNG situation, the Ras Laffan attacks, and Abu Dhabi’s LNG export constraints, around 12–13 million tons per year of LNG capacity have been disrupted or placed at risk. At the same time, Europeans still don’t understand that logistical bottlenecks are stripping an additional 5–10% of effective supply from the system. This comes at a time when European gas storage levels remain critically low relative to seasonal requirements; the buffer that policymakers, especially in the Netherlands, assume will protect them is not there and will not be for a long period.
In this context, which is not yet in the minds of Europeans, the suggestion that US LNG could be used as a bargaining chip should not be assessed as provocative but as a clear sign of destabilization. LNG is not oil, as it cannot be redirected instantly without consequences. LNG volumes are contracted, infrastructure fixed, and flexibility is very limited. If US flows are even partially withheld, repriced, or politically conditioned, Europe does not have a ready substitute. This is already happening, as seen in the growing number of LNG cargoes meant for Europe now being rerouted to Asia. The idea that alternative suppliers can seamlessly fill the gap is not only comforting fiction for politicians but also an increasingly dangerous position to take.
The changes in the market at present are no longer linked to market fluctuations but rather to the emergence of energy as an overt instrument of Western intra-alliance power politics. The Trump Administration is not even hiding it behind ambiguity anymore. Washington’s analysis is clearly based on the understanding that its structural position in global gas markets has never been better, and it is prepared to use it. The irony is difficult to ignore. For decades, the United States has been criticizing others, especially Russia and OPEC (oil), for weaponizing energy. At present, Washington signals it is willing to do the same, though that is still couched in the language of trade negotiations rather than geopolitical confrontation.
The response from Brussels has been, until now, dangerously complacent. There is still a tendency in Brussels to treat these signals as rhetorical excess rather than as strategic intent. European diplomats should wake up to the fact that they are misreading the moment. Even if no immediate action is taken, a strong and dangerous precedent is being set. The market will certainly internalize it, increase risk premiums, and reassess long-term contracts. At the same time, trust (emotions also), which is the invisible foundation of energy trade, will erode.
Europe's energy insecurity directly threatens industrial output, consumer bills, and economic competitiveness. Recognizing these tangible risks should inspire policymakers to prioritize immediate measures, fostering a sense of responsibility to prevent deindustrialization and economic decline.
The Brussels approach is clearly not like that of an investment fund, which prides itself on prudence. By refusing to confront domestic options, the European approach smells of negligence. One of the clear options for Europe is the Groningen gas field, which is clearly the most obvious but also the most politically sensitive. Europe’s largest onshore gas field has been treated for years as a closed chapter, a hydrocarbon relic of a past that Europe was eager to leave behind. While not dismissing the social and environmental concerns, it should be understood that, at present, there is a new strategic reality confronting the continent. Brussels and The Hague are willingly accepting external vulnerability while keeping their most significant internal resources off the table.
Looking at Iran-Ukraine but also Washington’s LNG weaponization, Europe should understand that this is no longer a tenable position. The choice is not between perfect solutions, but between controlled, managed risk at home and uncontrolled, external risk abroad. The reopening or partial reactivation of Groningen will be controversial, but it will also send a powerful signal. It would make clear that Europe is prepared to take responsibility for its own energy security. Brussels should also apply the same logic to other marginal fields across the continent. Even though none of these options are sufficient on their own, but collectively they will reduce the degree of dependency that now defines Europe’s position.
There is also the need to abandon another illusion. The EU, and all its member states, should abandon the illusion that the energy transition, in its current form, can deliver security in the near term. The role of renewables is important, but at present and in the years to come, they will not be a substitute for dispatchable gas in a stressed system. Hydrogen is a future promise, but definitely not a present solution. Electrification, while critical, as we have seen throughout the continent, does not eliminate the need for stable energy inputs. Europeans should understand and openly admit that the gap between policy ambition and physical reality is widening and being exposed by geopolitical events.
There is an increased need for strategic recalibration, as energy policy can no longer be treated as a subset of climate policy. Brussels and its members should not only recognize but also refine their strategies to make it clear that energy is a core component of national and European security. The latter means that there is a strong need to integrate supply security, infrastructure resilience, and geopolitical risk into every aspect of decision-making. At the same time, Brussels and cohorts should accept that some previously “unthinkable” options may need to be reconsidered.
Washington, at the same time, is playing a very rational game by leveraging its strengths in a world that is becoming increasingly transactional. LNG exports are now a real source of economic power. Washington now signals that it is willing to use that power. This is not a surprise, at least not from a purely strategic perspective. What is surprising is Europe’s apparent reluctance to respond in kind.
We are looking at a bigger risk here, which extends beyond the immediate energy crisis. If the transatlantic relationship is defined by conditionality and leverage rather than mutual trust, the foundations of this system are weakened, affecting not only energy but also trade, security, and the broader geopolitical balance. Europe cannot afford to drift into a position where it is simultaneously dependent and politically constrained.
Policymakers must treat this moment as a definitive wake-up call. The convergence of the Hormuz crisis, Qatari instability, and aggressive US signaling has created a perfect storm that leaves Europe dangerously exposed. This vulnerability is being noted by allies and adversaries alike. The longer Brussels ignores this shift, the more painful the eventual adjustment will be.
Europe is not stuck in a corner by accident. As Johan Cruyff might have said, poor positioning is a choice, and choices can be changed. However, reclaiming a seat at the table requires more than just hope. It demands the political courage to confront uncomfortable trade-offs. Passivity is a luxury Europe can no longer afford. While the Hague treats Groningen as untouchable, the ground is shifting beneath the entire continent. The era of comfortable assumptions is over. Energy has been weaponized once again, and the Old Continent is currently on the receiving end
By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com
